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NAVIGATING THE TAKINGS MAZE:
THE USE OF TRANSFERS OF DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS IN DEFENDING REGULATIONS AGAINST
TAKINGS CHALLENGES
Jennifer Scro*

I. INTRODUCTION:
JUSTICE SCALIA VERSUS PENN CENTRAL
Land use regulation, at whatever scale, typically generates passionate
opposition from landowners whose private property has lost value, and
their negative reactions often take the form of regulatory takings
challenges based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
anticipatory response, many communities have instituted Transfer of
Development Rights (“TDR”) programs to assist in defending their land
use regulations against such takings challenges.1 TDRs allow regulated
landowners to sell blocks of their development rights, unusable on the
regulated sites under the terms of the challenged regulations, to
purchasers who can use them to expand allowable development rights on
designated off-site receiving parcels.2 The sale of TDRs can thus
generate significant revenues for regulated property owners because
purchasers are often willing to pay large sums for the right to use the

* B.A. College of the Holy Cross; J.D. Boston College Law School. This Article
was prepared under the auspices of an advanced seminar designed to promote research
and publication of complex jurisprudential issues arising in contemporary land and
environmental law. The author wishes to thank the following seminar colleagues for
their intensive critical input during the months of the seminar: Julia Bramley, Diana Cuff,
Katelyn Homeyer, Heather Lacey, Zygmunt Plater, Eric Skeffington, and Mathew
Todaro.
1. As of 2010, there are approximately 239 TDR programs currently in effect or
proposed in the United States. ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE TDR HANDBOOK:
DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS, xxiv
(2012).
2. See id. at xix-xx, xxii.
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TDR credits to build at much greater intensity than otherwise allowed
under existing land use regulations.3
If TDRs are weighed as part of a court’s constitutional takings
balance under the Penn Central formulation,4 then many such challenged
land use regulations will be upheld, and the utility and market value of
TDR programs will remain secure. If, instead, the market value of TDRs
is excluded from the regulatory validity balance, then many regulations
would in all likelihood be struck down as excessively diminishing the
regulated landowners’ property values. Most courts follow the holding
in Penn Central, written by Justice Brennan, and include TDRs as part of
the landowner’s retained post-regulation property value in constitutional
takings balances.5 Conversely, Justice Scalia argues, in a stronglyworded concurring opinion, that TDRs should not be considered in
determining the amount of property values lost by regulated landowners;
rather, they should only be considered as part of a landowner’s
compensation package after the courts, disregarding the value of TDRs,
have found the challenged regulations unconstitutional.6 The difference
between the two conflicting roles of TDRs in courtroom challenges, and
the dialogue between these two approaches, will determine the future
viability of TDRs as an innovative land use tool in defining the publicprivate balances central to land regulation.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York is the central
Supreme Court holding in the area of regulatory takings. As in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,7 the Court’s first decision scrutinizing
regulatory takings, the Court’s formulation in Penn Central took special
notice of the degree of diminution of the regulated landowner’s property
value.8 In Penn Central, the majority held that TDRs represent valuable
3. For example, in 2011 in Brookhaven, New York, a single TDR credit sold for
about $88,000 on average. Pine Barrens Credit Sales 1996 through 2012, PINE BARRENS
CREDIT PROGRAM (TRANSFERS OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS), http://pb.state.ny.us/pbc/
pbc_credit_sales_ 1996_to_present.pdf (last updated Jan. 1, 2014). In 2011 in
Brookhaven, over twenty-six TDR credits were sold for a total sales value of over two
million. Id.
4. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978)
(discussing Penn Central’s ad hoc test).
5. See ARDEB G, RATHKOPF ET AL., 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 59:17 n.2 (4th ed.) and cases cited therein.
6. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747-48 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
8. Compare id. at 415 (“The general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”),
with Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual
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property rights retained by regulated landowners and, as such, are
directly relevant to the question of whether an excessive, invalid
regulatory taking has occurred.9 Justice Brennan wrote:
While these [TDR] rights may well not have constituted “just
compensation” if a “taking” had occurred, the rights nevertheless
undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has
imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into
account in considering the impact of regulation [on the regulated
landowner].10
For Justice Brennan, therefore, the value of TDRs is a factor in the initial
judicial determination of whether a regulation has “gone too far,” leaving
the landowner with no reasonable economic return.11 If a regulation is
indeed invalid, however, the TDR value may not be enough to constitute
sufficient “just compensation” in the circumstances.12 Justice Scalia
attacked the Penn Central majority’s formulation of the role of TDRs in
his separate concurring opinion in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency.13 He put a semantic turn on the definition of remaining value in

inquiries, the Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action.” (citation omitted)). Thus, regulatory takings challenges are subject
to the famous Penn Central balancing test that weighs the (1) economic impact; (2)
interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) character of government
action. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. This Penn Central triad essentially weighs private
diminution against government interests. See id. at 124-27 (describing various
applications of the triad to specific cases). The third element, “character of governmental
action,” has been to denote weighing the public’s interest against the private diminution.
PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 155-56
(3rd ed. 2004); see Leigh E. Cummings III, Finding the Third Penn Central Prong in
the Palazzolo Remand: Weighing the Public Purposes of Wetlands Protection
after Palazzolo and Tahoe, in PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY, NATURE,
LAW
&
SOCIETY 42,
42,
47-48
(Supp.
2007-2008),
available
at http://www.aspenlawschool.com/books/plater_environmentallaw/; see also Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The purposes
served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular regulation inform the takings
analysis.”).
9. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137.
10. Id.
11. See infra pp. 14-15 and notes 34-40.
12. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137.
13. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747-50 (1997)
(Scalia, J. concurring).
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the regulatory takings analysis, arguing that TDRs have no place in the
constitutionality balance.14 Justice Scalia wrote:
Just as a cash payment from the government would not relate to
whether the regulation “goes too far” . . . but rather to whether
there has been adequate compensation for the taking; and just as
a chit or coupon from the government . . . would relate not to the
question of taking but to the question of compensation; so also
the marketable TDR, a peculiar type of chit . . . relates not to
taking but to compensation.15
Justice Scalia was thus insisting that TDRs could only be part of the
compensation package once a court declares a regulation
unconstitutional.16 As such, TDRs become nothing more than a “peculiar
type of chit” or “coupon” from the government, not representing relevant
value to the regulated landowner.17
Justice Scalia’s formulation was seemingly rejected by Justice
Brennan’s utilization of TDRs as an essential property right to be
weighed in the takings regulatory balance. Justice Scalia attempted to
align his view with Penn Central’s holding by teasing out a distinction
on the Penn Central facts.18 In Penn Central, the affected corporate
property owner happened to have been able to use the TDR air rights
from a regulated historic train station to substantially expand
development on other properties it owned.19 Justice Scalia thus
acknowledged a narrow exception to his denial of including TDR values
in a Penn Central balancing test if a landowner could make personal use

14. See id. at 747.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 750 (“I suggest only that the relevance of TDRs is limited to the
compensation side of the takings analysis, and that taking them into account in
determining whether a taking has occurred will render much of our regulatory takings
jurisprudence a nullity . . . .”).
17. See id. at 747. Justice Scalia envisions TDRs as complicated governmental cash
vouchers for compensation for land regulation. Id. Except, as Scalia notes, the cash
comes from third party purchasers, rather than the government, and the government in
turn reimburses the purchasers for their “outlay” with a “variance from otherwise
applicable land-use restrictions.” Id. at 748. One commentator describes the Scalian
view of TDRs as believing that TDRs are “arbitrary administrative variances from land
use restrictions.” Paul Merwin, Caught Between Scalia and the Deep Blue Lake: The
Takings Clause and Transferable Development Rights Programs, 83 MINN. L. REV. 815,
816 (1999).
18. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
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of the TDRs.20 By restricting Penn Central’s holding to cases where
development credits can be used by the regulated landowners
themselves, Justice Scalia thereby separates TDRs from their status as
“market value” rights and asserts that TDRs “have nothing to do with the
use or development of the land to which they are (by regulatory decree)
‘attached.’”21
Justice Scalia was so disturbed by TDRs as a factor in the
constitutional balance that he argued: “taking [TDRs] into account in
determining whether a taking has occurred will render much of our
regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity.”22 He was perhaps building
upon the not-unreasonable fear that to escape constitutional liability
some governments might implement illusory TDR programs where the
TDRs would, in reality, have minimal value.23 TDR programs, however,
cannot serve in the constitutional balance as an escape valve for
government liability in regulatory takings challenges if the TDRs have
little value.24 All TDRs should be subjected to actual market value

20. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia reasoned
that TDRs can be part of the constitutionality balance if transferred to a nearby lot owned
by the same landowner, as had occurred in Penn Central. Id. He wrote:
This [Penn Central] analysis can be distinguished from the case before us on the
ground that it was applied to landowners who owned at least eight nearby parcels,
some immediately adjacent to the terminal, that could be benefited by the
TDRs. The relevant land, it could be said, was the aggregation of the owners’
parcels subject to the regulation (or at least the contiguous parcels); and the use of
that land, as a whole, had not been diminished. It is for that reason that the TDRs
affected “the impact of the regulation.” Id. at 749 (citation omitted). For Scalia,
therefore, TDRs represent an essential property right only when property owners
are able to transfer credits to other parcels they own. Although Scalia typically
refuses to look beyond the sending parcel for the takings analysis, see id. at 750,
when regulated landowners can transfer TDRs to their own property, Scalia
considers both the sending and receiving parcel.
However, by confining TDRs to compensation and carving out an exception for personal
use, Scalia deprives TDRs of their usefulness and value. If TDRs do not represent real
property rights with the potential to offset government liability in the regulatory validity
analysis, then local governments have little incentive to implement TDR programs.
Moreover, even if local governments create a TDR program there could be no TDR
market because landowners could only transfer the credits to their own property. If a
landowner does not own another parcel in the receiving area, the TDR is essentially
worthless.
21. See id. at 747.
22. Id. at 750.
23. See infra pp. 30-32 and notes 62-67.
24. See, e.g., Fred. F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381,
387-88 (N.Y. 1976) (finding the specific TDRs at issue worthless).
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analysis,25 and if their value is limited then their weight in constitutional
balancing is accordingly minimized.
Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s formulation in his separate Suitum
opinion appears to be an attempt to increase the burden on governments
defending regulations by deploying a combination of semantic
distinctions. On one hand, as noted above,26 he restricted the role of
TDRs in the takings validity balance to situations of personal use by
regulated landowners rather than acknowledging their marketability. As
a corollary semantic distinction, he thus sought to define TDRs in takings
challenges in terms of the regulated landowners’ diminished property use
rather than diminished value.27 Unless the landowners themselves could
“use” the TDRs, they would not be weighed. Their market value to the
landowner would not be acknowledged under the Scalian formulation.
The standard post-Penn Central constitutionality balance, however, does
not turn on “use,” but rather turns on the degree to which affected
landowners retain property value post-regulation.28 Because TDRs
primarily serve to allow regulated landowners to recapture lost value by
selling them in the marketplace, Justice Scalia’s semantic redefinition
provides no place for TDRs in the constitutionality balance.
The difference between Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia’s views is
not merely an interesting semantic or theoretical tension, but rather a
major issue in attacks on regulatory programs that use TDRs as part of
their fairness balances. If, as Justice Scalia argues, TDRs cannot be
weighed toward the validity of regulatory programs, there is little
practical governmental motivation to merely issue “coupons”29 to
compensate for unconstitutional takings.30 Consequently, the usefulness
and functionality of TDR programs would be lost. TDR programs are
25. TDRs are only valuable insofar as there is a viable market demand for them. If
few or none of a specific TDR program’s credits are being bought and sold, or are sold at
a very low value, then the TDR’s weight in the constitutionality balance is accordingly
reduced. See e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d at
388 (1976) (finding that TDRs had no effect on the validity given that the credits were
worthless because there was no designated receiving area).
26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
27. Franklin G. Lee, Transferrable Development Rights and the Deprivation of All
Economically Beneficial Use: Can TDRs Salvage Regulations That Would Otherwise
Constitute A Taking?, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 707-08 (1998).
28. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 350 (2002) (“[T]he categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the extraordinary
case in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value.”).
29. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. NELSON, supra note 1 at 100 (“[T]he Suitum decision may spell the beginning of
the end for TDRs as protection against takings challenges.”).
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only viable if the TDRs themselves are rightfully considered by courts to
be both an essential property right and a fungible market asset.
Among the many local government land use initiatives at stake in the
debate over the viability of TDR programs are programs like
conservation, open space, floodplain management, historic preservation,
agricultural, and other regulations where, under worsening economic
conditions, municipalities lack the funds needed to acquire fee simple
interest. TDRs, however, allow local governments to implement such
regulations, which would otherwise be economically excessive, without
purchasing the protected land outright. Yet, if TDRs are relegated to the
status of conjectural government coupons, as Justice Scalia insists, then
TDRs’ potential to mitigate the property value impact of local
government land use efforts is substantially undercut.31 This Article
analyzes TDRs as part of a property owner’s “bundle of sticks” and
therefore argues that their market value should be a mitigating factor in a
takings analysis. The second part of this Article notes the basic features
of effective TDR programs. Part III then explores the nuances of Justice
Scalia’s arguments limiting the utility of TDRs in takings challenges.
Part IV concludes that TDRs represent essential property rights and as
such should be a functional factor in constitutionality balances as well as
considerations of compensation should a court nevertheless find a
regulation invalid.
II. TDR BASICS
Many communities implement TDR programs for their regulatory
utility.32 In the classic zoning setting, transfers of development rights
allow landowners to sever their rights to develop and sell those rights to
another landowner to allow the receiving parcel to build at greater
density than would otherwise be permitted under local zoning
regulations.33 “Sending parcels” are typically regulated for lower density
or environmental or historical significance, where protective regulations
can severely diminish allowed uses and thereby the market value of the
regulated areas.34 The following illustration from the Huron River

31.
32.
33.
34.

Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See NELSON, supra note 1, at xix; Lee, supra note 27, at 679-80.
Lee, supra note 27, at 680.
Rick Pruetz and Erica Pruetz, Transfer of Development Rights Turns 40, 59 AM.
PLANNING ASS’N, PLANNING AND ENVTL. LAW 1 (2006).
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Watershed Council in Ann Arbor, Michigan depicts how density credit
type TDRs can operate.35

Illus. 1. Reprinted from Huron River Watershed Council, Economic Approach
to Watershed Protection, http://www.hrwc.org/publications/smart-growthpublications/transfer-of-development-rights/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).

TDRs help alleviate the economic burden of land use controls by
allowing regulated landowners to recapture some lost economic benefit
by selling TDRs. Consequently, the “receiving parcels” are often
designated growth areas that attract developers with the ability to build
beyond the constraints of zoning. Effectively implemented TDR
programs, therefore, can preserve environmentally sensitive and
historically significant areas while spurring local development.
TDRs have real economic value if well designed, which requires (1)
clear sending and receiving parcels, and (2) a demand for the TDR rights
in a functioning TDR market.36 A sending district is the area where TDR
credits originate. Thus, parcels in the sending district are typically
protected by some regulation, and landowners are eligible for TDR
credits. Alternatively, the receiving district is where the credits can be
transferred. For example, the map pictured below illustrates a TDR
program on Long Island, New York meant to preserve the Long Island
Pine Barrens. This map makes clear the preserved parcels eligible for
35. Huron River Watershed Council, Economic Approach to Watershed Protection,
http://www.hrwc.org/publications/smart-growth-publications/transfer-of-developmentrights/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
36. NELSON, supra note 1 at 53; see Pruetz, supra note 34, at 4-5 (detailing TDR
“success factors” and the actual detailed and complicated mechanics of a wellfunctioning TDR program); John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An
Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); see generally NELSON, supra note 1
(providing overview of the basic features of TDR programs, the economics behind TDRs,
TDRs’ relationship with planning, and a model TDR ordinance).
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TDR credits in the darker sending district, and the area the TDRs can
betransferred to in the lighter-shaded receiving district.37 If a TDR
program fails to designate a clear receiving district, then the TDRs will
be worthless because the credits cannot be sold and used. Similarly, to
be truly valuable, TDR credits must be an attractive purchase to create a
functioning TDR market.38 Often, TDR markets work best with a TDR
“bank” to serve as an intermediary between the sellers and buyers.39
Ultimately, TDR programs are tailored to the specific needs of each
individual community. Accordingly, the relative value of TDRs varies
greatly.40 Towns can use TDRs to preserve a wide variety of areas
including agricultural lands, historical monuments, and environmentally
sensitive property.41 Due to the broad range of TDRs’ utility, the type of
TDR will depend on the stated goals of the specific TDR program.
If TDR values are excluded from the regulatory validity balance,
then in many cases, regulations will be economically excessive. TDRs
can potentially mitigate government liability in takings because the value
of the credits offsets the economic impact of the regulation. TDRs allow
a landowner to recapture the diminished property value caused by the
regulation. For example, assume that before regulation Parcel A was
worth $100,000 but after is worth $50,000; if the regulated landowner
also receives $30,000 worth of TDR credits, then the owner can recover
$30,000 of the $50,000 in lost value. However, if the owner of Parcel A
receives credits that are essentially worthless, the landowner cannot
recover any lost value. Accordingly, such TDRs should have little effect
37. NEW YORK STATE’S CENTRAL PINE BARRENS, Long Island Pine Barrens
Protection Areas, http://pb.state.ny.us/maps_pdf/backup_Map-LIPB_core_cga_acres_
map.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). Note that this map is meant to be illustrative. Id. The
final receiving areas do not correspond exactly to the compatible growth areas. A map of
the actual receiving areas in Riverhead, New York is available in Proposed Final Central
Pine Barrens Plan and Supplement Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement,
Chapter 6 Pine Barrens Protection Program, 90-91 (1995). Although the actual receiving
areas are more limited than the compatible growth areas depicted on the included map,
the TDR program in the Long Island Pine Barrens has nonetheless been successful. For
example, in 2013 in Riverhead, New York, the average value of one “Pine Barrens
credit” was $58,598.48. NEW YORK STATE’S CENTRAL PINE BARRENS, Pine Barrens
Credit Sales 1996 through 2013, http://pb.state.ny.us/pbc/pbc_credit_sales_1996_to_
present.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
38. NELSON, supra note 1, at 53.
39. Sarah J. Stevenson, Banking on TDRs: The Government's Role As Banker of
Transferable Development Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1341-43 (1998).
40. Merwin, supra note 17, at 833 (“The exact form of development rights varies with
each specific TDR program.”).
41. See id.; Pruetz, supra note 34, at 1.
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in reducing government liability. The graphic below depicts how TDRs
allow regulated landowners to recover this lost value.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
P re - R eg u la tio n

P o st-R e g u la tio n

P r o p e rty V a lu e

P o s t-R e g u la tio n
w ith T D R s v a lu e
added

TDRs

III. INTO THE MAZE:
DEBATING TDRS’ ROLE IN THE TAKINGS VALIDITY BALANCE
Should TDRs be a factor in the courts’ takings validity balance, or
simply a form of compensation? Section A presents Justice Brennan’s
position in Penn Central that TDRs are a “mitigating” factor in the
takings analysis. Section B explains Justice Scalia’s position in Suitum
that TDRs are governmental “coupons” that can only be used for
compensation once a court finds a taking invalid. Finally, Section C
argues that Justice Scalia’s argument is an attempt to use TDRs to
refocus the takings analysis on the lost property uses, rather than
diminished economic value, thereby undercutting the validity of
regulations.
A. The Penn Central View: TDRs as “Mitigating” Factor
In its landmark takings decision Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, the United States Supreme Court considered TDRs as
part of the takings balance.42 The Penn Central Court held that the
42. See 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978); NELSON, supra note 1, at 100. Some commentators
suggest that Penn Central is contradictory on this point because later in the case the court
refers to TDRs in its compensation analysis. Merwin, supra note 17, at 836; Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. at 122 (“whether the transferable development rights afforded appellants
constitute ‘just compensation’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”). This
Article, however, asserts that this language is not contradictory. Rather, the Penn Central
court rightly noted that TDRs could be considered for both the constitutionality of the
taking and for compensation. The usefulness of TDRs to offset regulatory takings is not
limited to either mitigation or compensation, but should be considered for both
determinations.
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constitutionality of a regulation depends on an ad hoc contextual balance
of (1) the character of government action, (2) the regulation’s economic
impact, and (3) its interference with investment-backed expectations.43
Regarding TDRs’ place in this determination, Justice Brennan reasoned
that the TDRs must be part of the constitutional balance.44
Ultimately, the Penn Central balance is meant to weigh government
interests against the diminution in property value caused by the
regulation in question,45 in a constitutional context of democratic
fairness.46 Thus, because TDRs offset the economic impact of the
regulation upon the private landowner, Justice Brennan found that TDRs
must be a factor in determining whether an unconstitutional taking has
occurred.47
Subsequently, other cases applied Penn Central’s balancing test to
further define the modern regulatory takings framework.48 In 1987, in
Keystone Bituminous, the Supreme Court clarified that in determining the
value that a landowner has lost with the imposition of the regulation,
courts should look to the pre-regulation value of the landowner’s entire
“parcel-as-a-whole,” rather than simply the regulated property portion or
right.49 Additionally, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo
reasoned that in weighing the character of government action, courts
should not only consider diminution in value, but also the public purpose
of the regulation.50 Finally, the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council court
further highlighted that reasonable remaining value is the true measure of
regulatory takings analysis, rather than the remaining uses available postregulation.51 In sum, the modern regulatory takings analysis weighs the

43. Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
44. Id. at 137.
45. PLATER, supra note 8, at 1146.
46. Id. at 1154 (Justice O’Connor’s Palazzolo concurrence emphasizes public-private
democratic fairness balance).
47. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
48. See PLATER, supra note 8, at 1155.
49. The same could be said of Penn Central in that the court did not consider the loss
of air rights separately from the potential economic profitability of the entire terminal.
Thus, the Penn Central court also weighed the private diminution against the preregulation economic value of the entire parcel, rather than simply the loss of the regulated
air rights.
50. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring); PLATER, supra note 8, at
1154.
51. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 331 (2002).
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diminution of private property value of the parcel as a whole against the
regulation’s public purpose.52
Accordingly, one reason that the Penn Central court may have
included TDRs as a factor in the takings analysis is because the Penn
Central TDRs were indeed valuable. In Penn Central, the Penn Central
Transportation Co. claimed a taking after New York City’s Landmark
Preservation law prohibited the company from building an office
building over Grand Central Terminal. The regulation effectively
reduced the permissible zoning height over Grand Central, preventing
Penn Central Co. from utilizing its air rights over the Terminal. New
York City’s TDR program, however, allowed the company to transfer
development rights to other parcels to build higher than the maximum
permissible zoning height requirements in place. Nevertheless, Penn
Central Transportation Co. could only transfer the credits to a limited
number of parcels, and the process for receiving a transfer permit was
complex, among other problems.53
In recognizing these imperfections, the majority noted that
“[a]lthough appellants and others have argued that New York City’s
transferable development-rights program is far from ideal, the New York
courts here supportably found, at least in the case of the Terminal, the
rights afforded are valuable.”54 Here, the majority clearly regards the
TDRs’ value as the most important feature for the credits’ stake in the
takings analysis. A TDR credit can be limited and imperfect, but so long
as it retains legitimate economic value, it can still be used to mitigate
government liability in regulatory takings challenges.55 Therefore, the
amount that a TDR can mitigate the economic impact of the regulation
will depend directly on the TDR’s real market value.56
Justice Brennan reasoned that TDRs should be a factor in the
regulatory validity balance because they represent a valuable asset
property right in the bundle of sticks.57 By framing TDRs as a property
right included in the constitutional balance, Justice Brennan drew from
the arguments in the brief for the City of New York.58 The City argued
52. PLATER, supra note 8, at 1155.
53. John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 585-89 (1972); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
54. Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 137.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Brief for Appellees at 20, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206883 at *11, *15.
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explicitly that because the right to develop is a stick in the bundle of
property rights, the Penn Central Transportation Co.’s TDRs represented
a “valuable asset” that was fungible in the marketplace.59 Consequently,
the City reasoned that given that TDRs represented a valuable market
asset, the development credits preserved the economic value of the air
rights above the terminal. 60
B. Justice Scalia Responds:
TDRs as Merely Relevant in Calculating Compensation
In contrast to the Penn Central formulation, in his concurring
opinion to Suitum, Justice Scalia argued that TDRs are not an essential
property right that might mitigate takings liability, but rather a “coupon”
from the government.61 For Scalia, TDRs merely represent an in lieu of
cash “chit” that governments can use to pay affected landowners.62 As
such, TDRs represent a form of compensation, relevant only after a court
has declared a regulation invalid.63 By removing TDRs from the initial
validity review, moreover, Scalia’s formulation would clearly
substantially multiply the number of regulations struck down as invalid.
Justice Scalia defined the transfer of TDRs as the creation of a new
unit rather than a valuable property right in itself, thereby erasing TDRs’
applicability in the takings balance:
TDRs, of course, have nothing to do with the use or development
of the land to which they are (by regulatory decree) “attached.”
The right to use and develop one’s own land is quite distinct
from the right to confer upon someone else an increased power
to use and develop his land. The latter is valuable, to be sure, but
it is a new right conferred upon the landowner in exchange for
the taking, rather than a reduction of the taking.64
Here, Justice Scalia appears to admit that TDRs can have potential value,
but attributes that value not to the affected land, but to rather the artificial
new credit purchasable by the person buying the credit.65 By severing
the value from the land affected by the regulation, Justice Scalia strips

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id.
See id. at 15.
Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring); NELSON supra note 1, at 100-01.
Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747-48.
Id.
Id. at 747.
Lee, supra note 27, at 700.
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TDRs of their usefulness in defending the regulation.66 TDRs can only
mitigate government liability to the extent that their value offsets the
economic impact of the regulation upon the landowner’s property.67 To
mitigate liability, the value of the TDR must inherently be attributable to
the affected landowner.68 Under Justice Scalia’s reasoning, however, any
potential for TDRs to mitigate the economic impact on the regulated
landowner becomes moot as it is not a “use” of the landowner’s land,
andthe economic value is only to whomever buys the credits.69 By
severing TDRs’ value from the affected landowner’s property, Justice
Scalia is able to justify his position that TDRs have no place in the
constitutional balance.70
Problematic elements and potential uncertainty in the particular Lake
Tahoe TDR program in Suitum may have enhanced Justice Scalia’s
rejection of TDRs as a property right.71 Whereas Penn Central’s TDRs
had a restricted receiving area and a complex but financially tangible
permit system, Lake Tahoe’s TDR program was far more complex,
unusual, and uncertain.72 Although the Court ultimately upheld the Lake
Tahoe regulation, the value of the Suitum TDR credits was quite
uncertain because landowners could only use some types of TDR credits
if they also received an additional type of credit distributed through a
lottery system.73 Thus, the value of the plaintiff’s TDRs was in doubt,
considering that the one TDR credit she received had limited
66. See NELSON, supra note 1, at 100.
67. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
68. Id.
69. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. See id.; see also Lee, supra note 27, at 700; NELSON, supra note 1, at 100.
71. R.S. Radford, Takings and Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme
Court: The Constitutional Status of TDRs in the Aftermath of Suitum, 28 STETSON L. REV.
685, 691 (1999) (ultimately, because plaintiff never applied for the TDR program, the
value of her TDR credits was unknown. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that case
was not ripe for adjudication).
72. See id.
73. Tahoe Regional Planning’s TDR program allowed landowners to receive three
types of TDRs: (1) Residential Development Right (RDR); (2) Land Coverage Rights
(LCR); and (3) Residential Allocations, which were awarded by lottery system. To build
using these credits a landowner needed both a RDR and RA. Because plaintiff’s parcel
was located in the received area, it automatically had an RDR credit with the possibility
of receiving three bonus TDR credits. RA credits, however, were only distributed by
lottery. At least one commentator defended TRPA’s lottery system as possibly “the most
fair and equitable way to spread the burden of TRPA’s development restrictions over
similarly situated landowners.” Lee, supra note 27, at 706. Still, RA credits were the
most valuable TDRs, and the plaintiff had only a one in five chance of receiving it by
lottery. See Radford, supra note 71, at 691.
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independent fungibility.74 In contrast, the Penn Central TDR program,
however imperfect, was far more typical of TDRs in that all of the Penn
Central credits were independently useful and valuable (on the regulated
owner’s other properties or any other properties within the designated
receiving area).75 The vagueness of the Lake Tahoe TDR program is
perhaps one reason that Justice Scalia used it as an opportunity to portray
TDRs as only a form of compensation, and a very minimal
compensation, rather than a valuable property right in the
constitutionality balance.76
Despite Justice Scalia’s contrary arguments, many courts have
followed the Penn Central holding by weighing TDRs in the takings
validity balance in determining the economic impact of the regulation
and its interference with investment-backed expectations.77 For example,
in Gardner v. New Jersey Pineland Commission, the New Jersey
Supreme Court directly considered TDRs as a significant factor in the
takings balance.78 In Gardner, a farm owner challenged the state’s
Pineland protection regulations that severely limited residential
development and restricted all undeveloped land to agricultural use as an
invalid uncompensated taking.79 The regulations created a TDR program
for landowners in the Pineland protection area who incorporated the
regulation’s restrictions into their deeds. Once in conformity with the
regulations, the New Jersey Pineland Commission awarded these
landowners with Pineland Development Credits (PDCs) that enabled
landowners to sell their development rights in “designated Regional
Growth Areas.”80 Although many PDCs sold “privately at market
prices,” at least one county’s PDC bank reported payments of $10,000
per credit.81 In upholding the constitutionality of the regulations, the
Gardner court adopted Brennan’s view that TDRs should be
incorporated into the takings balance: “Penn Central could offset its loss
by transferring valuable property rights to other properties, even if such
transfers did not fully compensate it. Plaintiff possesses the similar right
to offsetting benefits; it may receive Pinelands Development Credits in
return for recording the deed restrictions.”82 Thus, the potential
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Radford, supra note 71, at 691.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
See Radford, supra note 71, at 691.
See RATHKOPF, supra note 5, § 59:17 n.2 (4th ed.) and cases cited therein.
Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251, 261 (1991).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 261.
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economic value of the PDCs factored into the Gardner court’s
application of the Penn Central constitutionality balance.
Likewise, in Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, the
California Supreme Court rejected a facial takings challenge to a zoning
ordinance that designated property open space because the ordinance
also permitted the plaintiff to receive compensating density credits on
adjoining parcels.83
Aptos Seascape Corporation (Seascape) had
purchased 110 acres on the California coast.84 Subsequently, the
countyadopted a comprehensive plan85 that designated seventy of these
acres “[o]pen reserve park playground.”86 The zoning ordinance,
however, also permitted the company to receive transferrable density
credits.87 These credits allowed Seascape to build at a greater intensity
than normally permitted under zoning regulations on its remaining forty
acres that were not designated as open space.88 In upholding the validity
of the ordinance, the court reasoned that because Seascape could receive
and utilize the density credits, it was “free to pursue [its] reasonable
investment expectations.”89 The Aptos Seascape court, therefore,
weighted the potential value and utility of the transferrable density
credits in determining the regulation’s constitutionality.90
Still, TDRs cannot entirely shield government from takings liability.
A taking can still be unconstitutional despite the presence of a TDR
program if the TDRs are insufficiently valuable. In Fred French F.
Investing Co., v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals
rejected a zoning amendment as unconstitutional, despite the
amendment’s TDR program, because the city did not designate any
receiving parcels for the credits.91 Without available receiving parcels,
83. Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 199-200 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982).
84. Id. at 193.
85. A “comprehensive plan” outlines the city or town’s goals and reasoning for its
local land use regulations for a period of time. California is known as a “plan state,”
meaning that local governments are required by state statute to implement such plans.
See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 3.16 (5th ed. 2003); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. &
Jonathan D. Witten, Windfalls, Wipeouts, Givings, and Takings in Dramatic
Redevelopment Projects: Bargaining for Better Zoning on Density, Views, and Public
Access, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 325, 332 (2005).
86. Aptos Seascape Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
87. Id. at 200.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Fred F. French Investing Co., v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 388-89 (N.Y.
1976).
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the TDRs were only “disembodied abstractions of man’s ingenuity,
float[ing] in . . . limbo,” and, therefore, essentially worthless.92 The
court, however, made clear that valuable TDRs would still be considered
in determining a regulation’s validity:
[T]he development rights are an essential component of the
value of the underlying property because they constitute some of
the economic uses to which the property may be put. As such,
they are a potentially valuable and even a transferable
commodity and may not be disregarded in determining whether
the ordinance has destroyed the economic value of the
underlying property.93
Given that TDRs’ weight in the validity balance is contingent on
their economic value, if the TDRs are worthless, as in French, they will
have no impact on the balance.94

92. Id. at 388.
93. Id. at 387.
94. Despite the fact that TDRs do not automatically circumvent takings liability under
the Penn Central takings balance, Scalia feared that local governments could use TDR
programs to circumvent liability under what would otherwise constitute an
unconstitutional taking under his holding in Lucas. See Merwin, supra note 17, at 84143. Writing for the majority in Lucas, Justice Scalia held that a regulation that deprives a
landowner of all economic value is a categorical taking. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). Unlike Penn Central, the Lucas analysis did not
balance or consider the weight of government interests at all. See id. If, however, a TDR
regulation grants regulated landowners viable and valuable credits, the landowners retain
some economic value and, therefore, do not fall under Lucas’s per se taking rule.
Merwin, supra note 17, at 842-43. Regulations that fall short of Lucas’s complete
economic deprivation standard—as virtually all do—are analyzed under the Penn Central
balancing test. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 303 (2002) (“Lucas was carved out for the “extraordinary case” in which a
regulation permanently deprives property of all use; the default rule remains that a fact
specific inquiry is required in the regulatory taking context.”). Moreover, if, as in
French, the TDRs are worthless, the credits will not relieve the government of liability
under either Lucas or Penn Central. Nevertheless, it could well have been the potential
of TDRs to “sidestep” Lucas that prompted Scalia to argue that allowing TDRs as
mitigation in the takings analysis would “render much of our regulatory takings
jurisprudence a nullity.” Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 749
(1997) (Scalia, J. concurring); Merwin, surpa note 17, at 840-41.
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C. Justice Scalia’s Use of TDRs to Reorient the
Focus of the Takings Analysis on Diminished Property Use
Justice Scalia’s framing of the takings review role of TDRs focuses
on the degree of actual use rights in regulated land before and after
regulation, rather than the value of the land to the regulated landowner.95
Framed this way, because TDRs do nothing to mitigate the diminished
use of a regulated parcel they are irrelevant to a Scalian takings test and
regulations will more easily be struck down.
Even if TDRs allowed an affected landowner to re-capture the entire
value lost due to regulation, Justice Scalia’s emphasis on regulated use
rather than value would mean that the regulation could nevertheless still
be void as an excessive regulatory burden on the landowner.
Justice Scalia’s stratagem, reframing TDRs to undercut regulations’
validity, echoes similar previous attempts where he focused on
properties’ active use rather than owners’ remaining property values. In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, he asserted that regulation is
categorically unconstitutional when it “denies an owner economically
viable use of his land.”96 Although in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme Court
clarified that diminished value is the true focus of the taking analysis,97
Scalia strongly disagreed by joining the Thomas dissent, which stressed
the importance of deprived use over diminished value: “[n]o one
seriously doubts that the land-use regulations at issue rendered
petitioners' land unsusceptible of any economically beneficial use. . . .
These individuals and families were deprived of the opportunity to build
single-family homes . . . on land upon which such construction was
authorized when purchased.”98
Thus, Scalia regards the takings analysis as protecting landowners’
physical uses of their property. Inherently suspicious of government
regulation, Scalia’s “use” formulation would create an even lower
threshold for regulatory invalidity because lost use definitions tend to
95. See Lee, supra note 27, at 708-09.
96. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (emphasis added) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
97. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331; see also PLATER, supra note 8, at 1160-61.
98. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Scalia’s
opinions evince a marked antagonism to regulation of private property, even referring to
government as a “thief” in his Palazzolo concurrence. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, for Scalia, one way to protect
landowners from this governmental “thief” is to relegate TDRs to a government
“coupon” and confine their viability merely to post-verdict compensation.
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incorporate the landowner’s optimistic individual plans.99 In contrast, an
analysis based on appraisals of market value is substantially more
objective.100 Accordingly, because TDRs restore ascertainable lost value
to regulated landowners, they deserve a place in the constitutionality
balance.
As to Justice Scalia’s narrowly acknowledged exception—allowing
TDRs to weigh in the constitutional balance only when the regulated
landowners themselves could “use” them themselves on their own
adjacent lands—a number of courts have expressly rejected that view
and instead incorporated Penn Central’s formulation that TDRs are a
mitigating factor when TDR transfers are to third parties.101 In Good v.
United States, the Federal Claims Court upheld the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers’ denial of a permit to drain and fill protected wetlands against
a takings challenge by considering the value of $110,000 worth of TDR
credits to the plaintiff.102 The Good court expressly rejected Justice
Scalia’s Suitum argument:
While the concurring Justices in Suitum clearly indicate
opposition to this proposition [that TDRs are relevant to
determining takings liability], their opinion underscores the
Court's reaffirmance of the Penn Central holding that the value
of TDRs is to be considered to answer the threshold question of
whether a taking has occurred.103
99. See Brian Crossman, The Use-Value Distinction in Regulatory Takings Law: Which
Property Interest is Protected by the Constitution, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY,
NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 96, 100 (Supp. 2004-2005), available at http://www.
aspenlawschool.com/books/plater_environmentallaw/updates/21_Crossman_Takings_Use_
Value_Article.pdf. For example, in Palazzolo the plaintiff’s diminution arguments used
Mr. Palazzolo’s hopes to build seventy-four single-family homes in an eighteen-acre marsh
as the basis of their loss of use calculation. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
100. Crossman, supra note 99, at 103.
101. Some jurisdictions do not allow TDRs to serve as any form of compensation
because state constitutions require payment for takings to be in cash. For example, the
Arizona appeals court found a zoning ordinance unconstitutional but refused to consider
TDRs as part of the landowner’s compensation package because the “state constitution
requires compensation for a taking to be made by payment of money in an amount that
has been judicially determined.” Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528, 540 (Ct.
App. 1985) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1986). Because TDRs
represent a fungible market asset rather than straight cash, TDRs could never constitute
adequate compensation under state constitutions. Consequently, whatever small utility
TDRs retain under Scalia’s personal use exception would disappear at the state level.
102. 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 84, 107, 114 (Fed. Cl. 1997) aff’d, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
103. Id. at 108.
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Although Scalia attempts to evade Penn Central with his personal
use exception, the Good court reveals the contradiction. The Penn
Central Court’s calculation that TDRs are part of the constitutionality
inquiry applies to all TDR programs, not simply credits transferred
between the same landowner.
IV. INCLUDING TDRS IN THE TAKINGS CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
If courts followed Justice Scalia’s lead in truncating the nature and
role of TDRs in takings balances, the functionality of economically
viable TDR programs would be severely undercut. With TDRs stripped
of their practicality, local governments would have little incentive to use
TDR programs and would be further discouraged from enacting
regulations that might be vulnerable without them. In the event that
TDRs are relegated to government coupons, bereft of regulatory force,
local governments would not implement them and property owners
would not buy them.
Therefore, to maintain TDRs’ continuing viability, courts should
consider TDRs as a mitigating property right both in the takings analysis
itself and for potential post-verdict compensation. By including TDRs in
both analyses, courts can preserve TDRs’ status as essential property
rights and market assets, and ensure that diminished value is the proper
measure of the takings analysis.
Accordingly, to accomplish these functions transparently, courts
appropriately proceed with a three-step approach.104 First, a court
considers the economic effect of the regulation on the property value in
order to establish the degree to which the challenged regulation has
depleted the market value of the regulated property.105 Using accepted
courtroom appraisal methods, financial impact is determined objectively
by comparing the property’s economic value before and after the
regulation.106 The constitutional balancing test effectively determines
how much the regulation has diminished the property’s economic value
and the extent to which TDRs allow landowners to recapture some of
that lost value.107

104. See, e.g., Gardner, 593 A.2d at 261; Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030,
1036 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192
n.14 (Ct. Cl. 1981); RATHKOPF, supra note 5 (collecting cases).
105. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
106. Gardner, 593 A.2d at 205.
107. Id.
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Second, a court weighs the value of such TDR credits.108 If the TDR
credits are valuable, then the constitutional balance will tip in favor of
regulatory validity because the credits will reduce the economic
diminution caused by the regulation. In contrast, if the TDR credits have
only slight value, then the constitutional balance will remain unchanged.
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s fear that TDRs will circumvent takings
liability is unfounded because if a TDR program produces credits of
inadequate value, then the program will have little to no impact on
mitigating government liability in takings. Finally, if a court finds an
unconstitutional taking—the regulation is unconstitutionally excessive,
notwithstanding the TDRs’ value—then TDRs will also appropriately be
considered in determining compensation.109
Justice Brennan in his majority decision in the classic Penn Central
case and Justice Scalia in his separate Suitum opinion set out starkly
conflicting notions of TDRs’ role in regulatory takings. Justice Brennan
asserted that TDRs are a significant factor to be weighed in the
constitutionality balance, in determining whether a regulation has gone
too far in imposing economic burdens on regulated landowners. Justice
Scalia instead argued that TDRs must be excluded from the takings
balance and only considered as partial compensation when regulations
are struck down, as many would be, if balanced without TDRs. Justice
Scalia attempts to focus the takings analysis on loss of actual physical
use of land, rather than the more normal focus on the extent of a property
owner’s diminished value. Viewed in context, Justice Scalia’s semantic
formulations fundamentally multiply a regulation’s negative effect on a
regulated landowner, excluding the very real retained private values
attributable to transferable credits in well-designed TDR programs.
Instead, to support TDRs’ continuing utility, courts rightfully consider
TDRs based on their actual ascertained market value in navigating the
complex mazes presented by constitutional takings cases.

108. See id. at 124-28.
109. Id. at 130. Although TDRs alone might not fully constitute “just” compensation,
they should still be included in the final compensation package. For example, if “just
compensation” is $100,000 and a regulated landowner has $30,000 in TDR credits, then the
TDRs should be included as compensation to force the government to pay the difference—
$70,000.
The amount that TDRs contribute toward the regulated landowner’s
compensation, like the constitutionality balance, will depend on their value.

